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EDWARD W. HAUGHNEY*

Developments in Status
of Forces Agreements
During the period December 1, 1966, to November 30, 1967,
33,401 United States military and civilian personnel and their dependents were charged with offenses subject to the primary or exclusive
jurisdiction of foreign tribunals. 31,466 or 94% were charges against
military personnel. United States military authorities obtained a waiver
of primary foreign jurisdiction in 84.4% of the cases involving
concurrent jurisdiction offenses charged against military personnel. This
is a significant improvement over last year's waiver rate of 82.7%. The
NATO waiver rate was up to 93.4% from last year's 90.9%.
It was encouraging to note that the Department of Defense
considers present status of forces arrangements so far workable and
satisfactory and that no United States commander has reported that
jurisdictional arrangements have had a significant adverse impact on the
accomplishment of his mission.
Application of NATO SOFA Within the United States
Military and civilian members of foreign forces and their dependents, while in the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
US courts, both state and Federal, unless they are expressly exempted
by treaty or have diplomatic immunity. Currently the NATO SOFA is
the only agreement which limits the jurisdiction of US courts over
members of foreign forces and their dependents in the United States.
The only other authority for the exercise of jurisdiction by a
foreign country over its personnel in the United States is contained in a
US statute (22 USC 701-706) which provides that the service courts of
friendly foreign forces within the United States may exercise a limited
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jurisdiction over their personnel when its provisions are made operative
by Presidential Proclamation. At present Australia is the only foreign
country to which the statute has been made operative by Presidential
Proclamation. (No. 3681 Oct 14, 1965, 30 F.R. 13049)
Recent SOFA Developments
Negotiations for a SOFA with the Kingdom of Thailand, and with
the Commonwealth of Australia for a reciprocal SOFA, which were
initiated several years ago, continued during the reporting period and
are still in progress.
Three law suits of interest to this committee were as follows:
1. In May of this year, SP4 H. K. Smallwood, Jr., who was
indicted in April by the Korean authorities for the alleged murder of a
female Korean national and for arson, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the US District Court of the District of Columbia. He
also sought an order enjoining the Secretary of Defense, and all
subordinate commanders, from releasing him to the Korean authorities
for trial. In essence, Specialist Smallwood contended that the US-Korea
SOFA is unconstitutional and that a trial by the Korean authorities
would deny him due process of law. On June 25th, the District Court
denied the petition, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.C. DC 1968) and Specialist
Smallwood appealed this decision to the US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Decision in that court is still pending. On July 2,
1968, Specialist Smallwood was convicted of murder and arson by the
Korean authorities and sentenced to 15 years confinement. He has
filed an appeal in the Korean courts and remains in US custody pending
disposition of that appeal.
2. The issue of the constitutionality of Article 2(10) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (subjecting persons, who in time of
war are serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field, to
the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is being
litigated by Mr. James H. Latney. Mr. Latney, a merchant seaman on
the SS AMTANK which delivered military petroleum products to the
US armed forces at DaNang, was charged with the premeditated murder
of a fellow crew member in a bar in DaNang. In an effort to prevent his
trial by court-martial in Vietnam Mr. Latney petitioned the US District
Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. That
Court denied the writ on January 16, 1968, holding that Article 2(10)
is constitutional, that a "time of war" existed in Vietnam and its
offshore waters, and that Mr. Latney was a person serving with or
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accompanying the forces within the meaning of Article 2(10). (James
Henry Latney v. Dean Rusk et al. Habeas Corpus No. 539-07). He was
then tried by court-martial and sentenced to 15 years confinement. Mr.
Latney appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, which heard argument on June 14, 1968. That
appeal is still under advisement.
3. On 14 October 1968 the US Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari (202 Misc, Oct Term 1968) in the case of O'Callahan v.
Parker (390 F.2d 36. C.A. 3rd Cir 1968). This grant of certiorari will
bring squarely before the court the question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War Tit 10, U.S.C. §
801 et seq. have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who
is charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and
having no military significance, alleged to have been committed off-post
and while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?
The case arises from a habeas corpus proceeding commenced by
petitioner in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania in April, 1966, in which he attacked the jurisdiction of
the court-martial and other alleged deficiencies in his trial.
After a trial by court-martial in the then Territory of Hawaii,
petitioner, a sergeant in the Army, was convicted on all charges against
him: assault with intent to rape, attempted rape, and housebreaking
with intent to commit rape (10 USC 934, 880, 930, respectively). On
11 October 1956, he was sentenced to confinement at hard labor for
ten years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable
discharge. The Army Board of Review affirmed, and in March, 1957,
the United States Court of Military Appeals declined review.
On 5 March 1958, the Army authorities transferred the petitioner
to the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. On 6 May
1960, the petitioner was released from confinement and placed on
parole pursuant to an order of the United States Board of Parole issued
under the provisions of 18 USC 4203 (1964 ed.), with 2,348 days
remaining to be served on his sentence.
In February, 1962, while still on parole, the petitioner departed
from Massachusetts and traveled to Arkansas without the permission of
his parole officer. At the time he absconded from Massachusetts, he was
wanted by the Boston, Massachusetts, authorities for allegedly committing the offense of rape.
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On 5 April 1962, while still on parole, the petitioner was
convicted by the Middlesex Superior Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on his plea of guilty to the offense of rape. The court then
sentenced him to a term of five to eight years. The petitioner was
released by the Massachusetts authorities on 21 February 1966, after
serving his sentence on the rape conviction. He was immediately
arrested by the United States Marshal under the authority of the parole
violator warrant and the provisions of 18 USC 4206.
After consideration of the petitioner's case, the United States
Board of Parole, on 3 March 1966, ordered the petitioner transferred to
a Federal penitentiary to await his parole revocation hearing. On 1 June
1966, the petitioner's parole was formally revoked by the United States
Board of Parole.
The petitioner's full term, less 180 days, now expires on 28
January 1972; and, with credit for statutory good time, his mandatory
release date is 16 June 1970.
A decision in favor of the petitioner in this case would not only
have a profound effect upon court-martial jurisdiction within the
United States but would, if applied in overseas areas, result in the
abdication to foreign authorities of jurisdiction over nearly all serious
crimes committed by United States servicemen overseas. The United
States military authorities would not then be able to accept waivers of
jurisdiction by foreign authorities and, based on last year's statistics,
approximately 18,000 servicemen per year would be left solely to the
jurisdiction of foreign courts.
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